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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A world record 200,000 people filled the Maracana 
stadium in Brazil hoping to see their heroes beat Uruguay 
in the 1950 World Cup f ~nal. The Brazilians lost and had 
to wait another four years for their chance to win the 
world's most prestigious sporting event. More than a 
quarter of a century later, on the North American 
continent, 77,000 people crammed into the Meadowlands, New 
Jersey and applauded the man who had thrilled and excited 
them for the last two and a half years; Pele was bidding 
farewell to his 'beautiful game'. Half a continent away, 
in the oil-dependent state of Oklahoma, the sun beat down 
on the artificial turf at Skelly Stadium, as the Tulsa 
Roughnecks tried to entertain the small crowd who were 
probably more interested in football and baseball than the 
game they were watching. 
In all these cases the center of attention was a game 
of soccer; the sport which at one time had threatened to 
eclipse all others in terms of popularity in the United 
States. 
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Soccer in the United States 
Soccer is a game which is generally considered to be 
the world's most popular sport and yet it has had 
relatively little professional impact in the United 
States. The recent demise of the North American Soccer 
League(NASL) seems to imply that a sport which is not part 
of the American culture will have difficulty finding a 
niche. A fundamental distinction is that the staple diet 
of American sports fans - football, baseball and 
basketball - had their origins in America (though evolving 
from non-~merican games in the case of football and 
baseball) while soccer has been imported to the US. 
American children are weaned on the 'traditional' 
American sports and watch or participate up to the high 
school level, while at college the more gifted athletes 
play and the majority spectate. Only the elite play at 
the professional level, so this could be considered the 
true spectator sport - the only realistic chance to 
participate being as a spectator. This hierarchy - many 
high schools, fewer colleges and very few professional 
teams - provides for the continual supply of players to 
make the finished product, which can be enjoyed directly 
by attendance at a sporting event, or indirectly via one 
of the branches of the media. 
Soccer has not yet consolidated this hierarchy in the 
United States as is evidenced by the lack of a stable 
professional league. Due to the game's alien nature, 
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college soccer developed before high school soccer for the 
most part. Correspondingly, although Rooney(l975) has 
stated that professional basketball and football only 
became prof it making ventures after acceptance at the 
collegiate level, soccer as a whole lacks the grass roots 
that the triumvirate of traditional American team sports 
possess. The time frame for acceptance to occur will 
probably be shorter in today's more technically 
sophisticated age but there seem to be two possible ways 
to 'establish' the sport. 
Cascio(l975) has developed a progression theory which 
can be related to soccer. It suggests that a sport will 
start off with a few children playing it - parents being 
the core of spectators at this stage. As the children 
grow up they develop their skills and introduce the sport 
at high school, college and ultimately the professional 
level. Some of the parents are still spectating but the 
bulk of the audience now come from the next generation. 
Eventually, the 'first generation' players become parents 
themselves and are more interested in soccer than their 
own parents who attended because of their child's 
involvement rather than a love of the sport itself. This 
process is continually repeated and could be termed the 
'grass roots' method of establishment. 
The alternative solution is to develop the 
organization from the top down. By having good 
professional teams a stimulus can be given to youngsters 
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who can then 'fill in' the gaps in the hierarchy. In a 
way this is what the NASL had tried to achieve. By using 
mostly foreign players, a relatively high standard of play 
had been placed on show to which young players could 
aspire. However, houses cannot be built on sand and thus 
the foundations have to be strong for a professional 
league to survive. Critics have pointed to the recent 
collapse of the NASL as an example of bad groundwork, 
which is partly the case. However, a professional league 
may provide a model for young players who can develop the 
underlying structure. In addition, as professional teams 
can be considered a yardstick or thermometer of a sport's 
condition in general, a thriving professional league is 
essential. 
The problem with soccer is a lack of commercial 
interest which has resulted in limited television 
contracts. Hockey is a similar case. Thus the purpose of 
this study is to make recommendations which would make a 
successful professional soccer league in the United States 
a feasibility. In particular, optimum locations for 
franchises will be deduced in order to maximize 
attendance. 
History 
It is generally agreed that soccer first appeared in 
the US in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the 
first form of the sport was played in a colony in Virginia 
in 1609. 
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In North American collegiate soccer the early 
adopters were the Ivy League colleges. However, Harvard 
led a small group of schools which played rugby and it was 
this sport that eventually surpassed soccer in terms of 
popularity and ultimately emerged as the game of grid iron 
football that we know today. Between 1920 and 1950 
intercollegiate soccer was confined almost entirely to the 
Northeast, although San Francisco and Los Angeles were 
significant western nodes. After World War Two the 
college game expanded at a rapid rate mainly due to the 
influence of American Gis stationed in Europe who 
revitalized the campus game on their return. The increase 
in foreign student enrollment at American Universities 
during the 1960s is considered another factor. Today the 
college game has spread to most areas of the United States 
but the professional scene is a different story. 
Professional Soccer 
The first professional soccer league in the States 
was the American Soccer League(ASL), created in 1933. It 
grew from ethnic clubs which fielded teams made up of 
European migrants and consequently the teams had names 
such as the Philadelphia Germans and the New Jersey Scots. 
In the 1930s and 1940s the league was restricted to the 
North Atlantic Seaboard areas of New York, New Jersey, 
Philadelphia and Baltimore. The league could be 
considered semi-professional as teams were primarily 
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social clubs where making prof its was of a secondary 
concern. 
The ASL's decline began when it was stripped of its 
exclusive rights to professional soccer in the East in 
1966 while additional professional rights were granted to 
the United Soccer Association(USA}. The league folded in 
1983 but reformed as the United Soccer League(USL}. 
Despite its rich history, the ASL never had any real media 
attention. This seemed to be reserved for a new 
professional league which boasted of having some of the 
world's greatest players. The stage was set for the birth 
of the NASL. 
Two leagues were formed in 1967. The National 
Professional Soccer League(NPSL} which had a $12 million 
television contract with CBS, and the USA which was 
officially sanctioned by America's governing body the 
United States Soccer Football Association(USSFA). The 
USA's twelve franchises were represented by whole teams 
imported from abroad while the NPSL pieced together its 
ten teams by signing players from all corners of the 
world. Not surprisingly, attendances were low and five 
teams dropped out of the two leagues at the end of the 
season. Despite these early setbacks the owners felt that 
a professional soccer league could succeed and the two 
leagues merged to form the NASL in January of 1968. 
The main benefit of having only one league was that 
competition was eliminated between teams in the same city, 
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but even this was not enough to prevent twelve teams 
folding by the end of the season, leaving only five 
franchises for the 1969 season. The average attendance 
was 3,400 per game in 1968 dropping to below 3,000 in 
1969. In 1970 however, two teams from the ASL were 
persauded to join the NASL and it seemed that the league 
had survived its worst period. In 1971 the Warner 
Communications Corporation decided to underwrite the New 
York Cosmos and attendances rose steadily for the next few 
years. In 1974 the league expanded to the West Coast for 
the first time since 1968 and by 1975 the NASL was making 
comfortable progress. In that year an event occured that 
could be considered the turning point for all levels of 
soccer in the United States. 
Pele was generally agreed to be the world's best 
player and had retired from soccer in his native Brazil at 
a relatively young age. When the New York Cosmos tempted 
him out of retirement with a lucrative contract, the NASL 
shot into national recognition. Pele's arrival stimulated 
the import of other foreign superstars and attendances 
soared in what had become a twenty team league. However, 
low attendances continued at some of the marginal 
franchises implying that the league had already exceeded 
its optimum size, or that only franchises with 'star' 
players would survive. By 1977 the league was down to 
eighteen teams but Pele's influence was still obvious as 
the Cosmos averaged 34,142 fans for each of their home 
games. 
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In 1978 franchise fees were up to $1 million dollars 
(having originally started in 1968 as $25,000!) but there 
was no shortage of potential buyers. With new teams and 
movements accounted for, the NASL expanded to 24 teams for 
the 1978 season. However this proved to be the NASL's 
peak as the number of franchises declined steadily each 
year until the league's collapse in 1985. This can be 
seen in figure 1 which shows the number of franchises in 
each year of the league's history. 
Reasons for the NASL's Failure 
Pele's arrival in the NASL boosted attendance and 
stimulated interest but also had a negative side effect. 
Other clubs, seeing the effect that one star could have on 
a team's attendance, followed suit by buying up 'name' 
players such as Johan Cruyff, Franz Beckenbauer and George 
Best. Consequently, wage bills throughout the league shot 
up. 
Reed(l980) has shown that in the NFL 40% of a team's 
budget is spent on players' salaries while in the NASL it 
is 70%. Without a large TV contract each team relied on 
attendance for its revenue and unfortunately the increased 
crowds throughout the league could not offset the wage 
bills. The Cosmos averaged 47,000 fans per game in 1978 
and yet still lost money, mainly because their roster had 
enough players to field two full teams and the reserves 
were all international stars who were paid extraordinary 
salaries whether they played or not. 
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Figure 1. The Number of Franchises in the NASL 1968-85 
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Another significant factor which has possibly 
hampered the NASL's growth can be loosely termed the 
'American culture'. If one considers the major American 
games of basketball, baseball and football, it can be seen 
that there is a certain preoccupation with statistics. 
Rebounds, runs batted in and yards rushing and passing are 
all food and drink to the American sports enthusiast! 
Similarly, any sporting event, from the high school up to 
the professional level, without the ubiquitous 
cheerleaders and porn porn girls would be considered an 
anomoly. It could be that traditional American sports 
lend themselves to these peculiar phenomena whereas soccer 
does not. 
Football, baseball and to a lesser extent basketball, 
are sports which combine periods of activity with periods 
of inactivity. Two minute warnings, seventh inning 
stretches and time outs are just another opportunity for 
TV companies to show a commercial or report a statistic, 
while spectators at a live event are entertained by porn 
porn girls. Conversely, soccer is a free-flowing non stop 
game divided into two 45 minute halves by a ten minute 
break. It may be argued that professional soccer's lack 
of success is due in part to it being a game upon which it 
is difficult to impose these American sporting traits. 
One of the reasons constantly cited as being 
responsible for the NASL's lack of success was the paucity 
of Americans on the respective teams. In 1973 75% of the 
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league's players were foreigners. This had prompted some 
to claim that the NASL was an acronym for Non American 
Soccer League! By 1975 each team was required to have six 
North Americans on their eighteen man roster; the idea 
being to provide the spectators with players they could 
identify with. 
Unfortunately Pele's effect on the NASL convinced 
owners that short term profits could be made at the game's 
expense and so the race was on to buy quality players from 
abroad while ignoring home grown talent. In addition, 
coaches skirted the rules by inducing foreign players to 
become naturalized Americans. Thus the Americans were in 
a 'Catch-22' situation whereby they were not as skilled as 
the foreigners and yet were not getting the game time they 
needed to improve because they were not good enough to get 
into the starting line-up! Additionally, colleges were 
not turning out the quality or quantity of players because 
they only played for three months of the year. Presumably 
development needs year-round training. 
Reed(l980) courted the opinion of Johan Cruyff 
(Pele's heir apparent to the title of the world's best 
player} who argued the case for producing more 'home 
grown' soccer talent in order to save money (According to 
Nuyer(l979) Warner Communications spent $750,000 on 
Beckenbauer, $800,000 on Chinaglia and $550,000 for 
Bogiecevic and Dennis Tueart.} However, Cruyff observed 
that there were no reserve team schedules and some 
colleges were reducing their schedules to cut costs. 
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In 1973, Brown saw Kyle Rote Jr as soccer's great 
American hope - someone that fans and future players could 
identify with. He was chosen by the Dallas Tornado in the 
first round of the draft more because of his local appeal 
than his college accomplishments. In 1974 the Cosmos then 
20 year old Rick Davis was voted the top North American 
soccer player and assumed Rote's mantle. The fact that 
these two players stood out pointed to the alarming lack 
of native American talent. It is perhaps this lack of 
identification more than anything else, which has been 
responsible for the game's minimal success in the States. 
This 'Americanization factor' can perhaps be seen in 
the case of indoor soccer which many see as the future of 
the game in America. The Major Indoor Soccer League(MISL) 
is a show more than a game and the audience is carefully 
targeted. Organ music during the game, a running 
commentary, spotlighted entrances by the players and an 
ice hockey style rink combine to make the game one of the 
fastest growing in the country. Half the league players 
are American and an audience is clearly being found as 
attendance has doubled in five years and compares 
favorably with its more mature rivals the NBA and NHL. In 
fact Eskenazi(l979) quotes the MISL's commissioner, Earl 
Foreman, as claiming 'We are the future, not the 
NASL ••• our game is more exciting, it's better for the 
spectators and we've got something the kids can relate to 
- Americans'. This would seem to prove a correlation 
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between success at the gate and Americanization. 
Deford(l983) claims that in the modern world all 
entertainment tastes are exported from not imported to the 
US - 'Soccer people might just as well try to force a 
monarchy on the US'. Thus indoor soccer is a uniquely 
American phenomena and is not an indication of soccer's 
popularity but of indoor soccer's popularity. It can be 
considered an entity in itself that competes with rather 
than as soccer. 
This seems to suggest that a strong professional 
league can provide a model to which Americans can aspire. 
This could eventually lead to the elimination of the need 
to import foreign players, while at the same time 
perpetuating the league's growth with players with which 
the spectators can identify. 
Perhaps the most important factor to be considered is 
the role of television. Kane(l967) observed that in 1967 
there was much optimism in the two rival leagues which 
preceded the NASL, as up to that time soccer had never had 
enough money behind it for adequate promotion or 
presentation to an American audience. CBS television had 
an initial contract with the National Professional Soccer 
League (NPSL) in 1967. However, the standard of play was 
relatively poor at the outset and Danny Blanchflower, the 
analyst for CBS, had no hesitation in telling his viewers 
that what they were watching was of comparatively poor 
quality. Blanchflower(l968) claimed at the end of the 
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season that he was justified in not enthusing over the 
play as other commentators did, as he considered that 
Americans needed educating and told good from bad. He 
also observed that few team owners had any real love for 
soccer. The TV companies, as co-promoters had to sell the 
product to the sponsors and viewers. In the first 
televised game between two American teams, the Baltimore 
Bays played the Atlanta Chiefs. The problem was that 
soccer's uninterupted flow was inconducive to commercial 
breaks, which are the lifeblood of any television company. 
So, to cater for this, pauses in the game were designed by 
players feigning injuries so that commercials could be 
inserted! Blanchflower eloquently concluded that 'Sport 
is a wonderfully democratic thing, one of the few 
battlefields left ... They (sports) do not belong to 
owners of athletic franchises or to TV companies. They 
belong to the people.' 
Unfortunately, this idealistic viewpoint is an 
anachronism in view of the role TV plays in sports events 
today. Reed(l980)reported that National Football 
League(NFL) teams received $5.3 million each from 
television contracts before they even took the field. 
With money like that available, TV becomes a dictator 
rather than a tool of a sport. The NFL is perhaps an 
exception however when compared to the NASL's TV contract 
in 1980 which netted each team a mere $27,000. As Reed 
says, 'The NASL has always drooled at the bounty that 
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comes with being an established major sport ... but the 
rainbow seems to be a little longer now, the pot farther 
away'. The situation any soccer league is faced with is 
convincing the TV companies that there is enough of an 
audience already there to make it worthwhile screening 
games. 
The Future 
Possible explanations for the game's lack of success 
have been analysed and seem to paint a gloomy picture. 
Several factors need to be considered however, in order to 
show that a league does have a future if certain 
guidelines are followed. 
Reed(l977) claims that soccer is a 'now' sport if one 
accepts that sports must follow peoples' moods not create 
them. The game is attracting the young rebelious people 
of the 1960s and people can identify with the creativity 
and the normal sized participants. In addition it is 
relatively cheap to play. 
At the college level, soccer is the fastest growing 
sport, with the number cf college teams rising from 223 in 
1977 to 544 in 1985. If recent growth rates continue, 
then in a few years time soccer will be played by more 
college aged youths during summer than baseball. At the 
youth level more than 1 million youngsters from 
kindergarten through college are caught up in the soccer 
boom. 
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All these points indicate that at the participation 
level at least, soccer is on the increase and so it would 
seem that at some stage the hierarchy is going to be 
completed. Television is probably the most important 
factor involved in sports franchise location today. That 
there is little TV company interest in soccer means that 
attendance is presently the most important variable 
dictating professional soccer's success. Consequently it 
is of paramount importance to maximize attendance, perhaps 
also proving to T.V companies that there is an audience, 
and so suitable franchise locations need to be chosen. 
Lowe and Harold(l972) conducted a survey to range the 
relative importance of the factors attracting college 
students to sports events. They concluded that the most 
important factor determining a~tendance was the popularity 
of or interest in a sport. This has been shown to exhibit 
regional variation. 
Study Objectives 
The NASL exhibited an unstable structure in terms of 
the location of its franchises. Many new locations, 
relocations and changes in the league's composition had 
occured. This indicates that a state of spatial flux 
existed whereby an equilibrium between demand and supply 
had not yet been resolved. 
Consequently, this thesis has two objectives: 
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i) To briefly examine the locational changes made by the 
NASL in the light of other professional sports leagues. 
ii) As there is relatively little T.V interest in soccer, 
attendance must be maximized. Thus optimum locations need 
to be identified in order to build the foundations of a 
successful league. This will be done by taking variables 
thought to be related to soccer interest and then 
combining these to give an index for each state and 
county. A simple model will then be utilized to assess 
different areas to ascertain how conducive they would be 
to a professional soccer franchise. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Academic works pertaining to sport in general and 
soccer in particular are not very common. The study of 
sport has been a neglected field perhaps due to its 
embryonic nature. Despite isolated studies, the sub-
discipline has only recently attained academic legitimacy 
with the publication of Rooney's~ Geography of American 
Sport in 1974. Studies of soccer in a geographical 
context, or in any context for that matter, are even more 
sparse. 
Bale(l981) in his definitive work on the geography of 
sport in Britain claims that there are barriers to the 
adoption of certain 'minority' sports. This theory can be 
applied to soccer in the US where competition with 
established sports has proved to be a substantial barrier 
to the widespread acceptance of the game. Additionally, 
Americans know little about the game and so need more 
exposure to it before they will 'adopt' it on a large 
scale. 
Petrie(l975) considers that prestige and status can 
be achieved through success in sport. Soccer is a game 
that would provide the US with a chance to compete with 
the rest of the world in a team sport that is 
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internationally recognized as oppossed to the more 
provincial sports of football and baseball. To do this 
however, some sort of infrastructure must be present to 
provide the national team with its players. Thus a 
thriving professional league is almost essential to 
achieve this goal. 
Rooney(l975) claims that when a sport becomes 
'established' or 'accepted' then regionalization takes 
place, whereby different areas have a different degree of 
emphasis. However, it may be argued that any sport will 
exhibit regional variety of interest and thus soccer must 
show some spatial variety in degree of emphasis whether 
one considers it to be established or not. Therefore if 
one can identify features which are indicative of interest 
in soccer, then ideal areas for franchise locations can be 
predicted. 
A successful league would be very lucrative 
financially as Mcpherson (1975) contends, but more work 
needs to be carried out on the motivation of spectators. 
As one of the most important prerequisite for the 
establishment of a professional sport, spectators are a 
very significant consideration. 
According to Lowe and Harold(l972) there is much more 
indirect than direct consumption of a sport. Direct 
consumption is essentially participation and spectating, 
whereas indirect consumption is exposure to the various 
media. This is perhaps not surprising considering that 
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less effort is required to consume indirectly - there is 
no travelling to stadia, braving adverse weather 
conditions or making a substantial financial outlay. Thus 
to induce someone to pay to watch a sport, requires 
stimulation of that person in some way. Presumably the 
more interested a person is in that particular sport then 
in theory the easier it will be to persaude him to 
spectate. Thus, finding the areas where people are more 
interested in soccer is of paramount importance in 
identifying optimum areas for franchise locations. 
Rooney(l975) attempted to locate franchises according 
to TV market areas using what was essentially a population 
based model. It was assumed however, that interest was 
uniform, while in reality of course, interest will vary 
for different sports and so the optimum locations will 
also be different for different sports. Thus any model to 
predict franchise locations must take into account 
interest levels specific to that sport 
Dunning(l969) has hypothesised that in Britain 
attendance at soccer games is a means of compensating for 
the boredom of work. Loy(l968) claims that a sports fan 
has a high personal level of investment and commitment. 
This can be contrasted with the spectator who is not 
especially interested in the sport itself. For instance, 
horse racing has the highest aggregate spectator 
attendance in the United States but is probably more 
attractive for the gambling associated with it rather than 
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its spectacle. Other spectators enjoy the social 
experience of being with their friends or just being part 
of the event's atmosphere. Being part of a crowd has been 
shown to engender a feeling of belonging and 
identification. This feeling is probably heightened when 
the spectator is watching a team sport such as college 
football, which stimulates an empathy with the local 
community. 
It has been hypothesised that certain events or 
periods of time can provide the stimulus for a 'spectator 
explosion'. Arum and King(l984} argue that Muhamed Ali's 
appearance on the boxing scene, increased boxing's 
popularity. In the case of soccer, Harvey(l975} cites 
Pele's appearance for the New York Cosmos in the NASL as 
the main reason for the game's increased popularity which 
was reflected in attendance and participation increases. 
This popularity can clearly ebb and flow and thus one of 
the aims of a professional soccer league, in the light of 
the subsequent decline in popularity of the NASL, must be 
to ensure that any future interest is sustained. 
Mcpherson(l972} has stated that the degree of 
consumption of a sport is directly related to such things 
as the importance of a sport to one's parents, the amount 
of primary sports involvement, the opportunity to engage 
in a sport as a participant and the number of 'significant 
others' that consume a sport. Kenyon and Mcpherson(l973} 
also riontend that one of the major factors concerned is 
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primary sport involvement. Thus, the person who actually 
participates in a sport, especially at a young age, is 
more likely to consume a sport as a spectator and at more 
frequent intervals. 
The least important factors were not related directly 
to the sport itself but to the infrastructure. The 
current trend is for major facilities to be constructed by 
the city, county or regional governments because of the 
great cost involved. There is great competition between 
major cities to attract professional teams; a professional 
franchise provides that area with a certain status and 
this 'national' image in turn encourages industry, 
business and tourist activities. Noll(l972) says that to 
qualify as a city an area must have 'an orchestra, a large 
library, a system of parks, a transportation system, a 
university and a public stadium in which to gather and a 
professional team to play there'. Thus an elaborate 
stadium must be offered as bait to team owners and 
nowadays these come equipped with cushioned seats, an 
artificial playing surface, restaurants and cafeterias, 
private suites, extensive car parks and giant TV screens. 
To the spectator, a parity has been reached whereby 
all stadia of fer virtually the same facilities so this 
should have little bearing on whether people can be 
attracted or not. However, the franchise owner might 
consider that a lack of facilities constitutes a less 
advantageous site. This can be seen in the case of the 
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NFL Raider's move from Oakland to Los Angeles because the 
Oakland Coliseum lacked the potential revenue making 
luxury boxes. 
There has been a relatively large amount of work 
undertaken on the factors affecting attendance at sporting 
events, but it must be remembered that these are for so 
called established sports. 
Quirk and El Hodiri(1974) developed a model which 
assumed that the higher the drawing potential of a 
franchise then 'the greater the gate receipts associated 
with every level of profitability of the home team's 
winning'. The pertinent conclusions arrived at were that 
an area's drawing potential was proportional to a team's 
strength in the long run. Share of gate receipts are 
significant as the higher the home team's share then the 
more revenue depends upon success at home games. Thus the 
larger this proportion is, the less chance small city 
franchises have for survival. The model proved a strong 
positive correlation between population and won-lost 
record indicating that a small city franchise will find it 
more difficult to attain playing success. 
Noll(l974) observes that 'A list of factors (that) 
influence attendance at professional sports contests is 
not difficult to assemble. Fans presumably prefer good to 
poor games, skillful to unskillful players and a winning 
to a losing home team ..• variations in team quality, prices 
and other demand related factors should produce greater 
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variation in larger cities'. It was concluded that 
baseball was a working class sport and that hometown 
population was crucial. For -example, in order to draw 1 
million fans, an average team would have to have a metro 
population of 1.9 million. This was believed to be 
related to playing success and it was observed that in 
only six SMSA's - New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, 
Philadelphia and Boston - will a consistent loser draw 1 
million fans each year. A New York team would gain over 
500,000 fans with the addition of a star player, while a 
city of 1.5 million would add about 65,000. 
Interestingly, an area with a large black population was 
shown to lead to lower attendance. This was considered 
due to less interest in attending baseball games, white 
racism and the tendency of cities with large black 
populations to have a lower quality stadium in an 
unattractive, relatively inaccessible area. The main 
conclusion reached was that very few additional cities 
could support a baseball team. Conversely, football has 
an 'obvious excess demand for its product' as most games 
were sold out. 
A survey of ice hockey teams showed that the club 
would attract more fans if the franchise were located on 
the Canadian side of the border. Jones, in a study on ice 
hockey franchise locations, determined that Saskatoon 
would be a good location despite its small metropolitan 
population. This was found to be due to minimal 
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competition with alternative forms of entertainment, a 
large affluent hinterland population and, most 
significantly, a high fan interest level. 
Chandler(l978) claims that not all sports are 
interesting on TV. He says that to succeed a sport must 
be dramatic which is an element that is not transferable 
beyond the stadia in soccer. Soccer is unpredictable and 
spontaneous, does not lend itself to the statistics loved 
by Americans and lacks the legitimized violence that is 
football. Consequently it is relatively poor TV 
entertainment. The implication is that if soccer cannot 
succeed on TV then it will never succeed as a spectator 
sport because of the limited amount of income from the TV 
companies. Michener(l976) reiterates this point when he 
implies that soccer and ice hockey are a dissapointment on 
television and are destined to be 'grand opera sports: 
something not for the lay multitude but for the perpetual 
joy of the connoisseur'. Michener claims that television 
plays a major role in determining where a franchise can be 
profitably placed and suggests that basketball cannot 
survive on T.V if the two main markets (New York and Los 
Angeles) field bad teams. The success of a professional 
team depends primarily however on the coverage it gets 
free in newspapers. Constant favourable mentions are 
better than paid advertising, radio or television. 
Thornes(l983) has suggested that the effect of 
weather on sports is considerable. Weather variables have 
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been utilized to assess their effect on attendance at 
sporting events in Britain but it was concluded that more 
research is needed to make any firm conclusions. Again, 
this might have implications pertaining to soccer. It is 
arguably more difficult to play good quality soccer in 
hot, humid conditions than it is in areas with more 
temperate climates. Consequently, the game's attractive 
powers are partially eroded in North America, as 
professional soccer leagues have always chosen to play in 
the hot summer months. This is because unlike gridiron 
football, with its short periods of activity interspersed 
with longer periods of inactivity, soccer is a game that 
requires almost continual movement for 90 minutes. Teams 
that play in hot, humid climates, including most Latin 
Americans, have adapted their style of play to conserve 
energy while concentrating on ball skills. 
It has been argued that artificial turf which many of 
the stadia have, detracts from the quality of play in 
soccer. This is because the surface is much 'faster' than 
grass and thus the ball is more difficult to control. 
Consequently,the quality of entertainment offered is lower 
and could therefore be a major factor contributing to 
small attendance. 
Rooney and Johnson(l983) claim that at the collegiate 
level soccer is merely a concession to foreign students. 
It was hypothesised that for soccer to gain national 
recognition it must be 'accepted at the high school level' 
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as this is an indication of community interest. They 
observed that soccer 'originated' in the north eastern 
United States, then spread to California with the interior 
parts of the continent being slower to 'adopt'. One of 
the main factors assumed to be responsible for this 
pattern was the degree of ethnicity of an area. There was 
found to be a correlation between a high percentage of 
foreign stock and a large number of schools playing 
soccer. This is not suprising as soccer is the most 
important game in a majority of the world's countries, 
especially Europe. Thus, there is a possibility that the 
demand to play (and presumably to watch) soccer is going 
to be higher in areas where there are many 'foreigners'. 
If soccer can overcome the barriers to its 
establishment then it can provide the US with a national 
team to compete on an international scale. This requires 
a professional league which would benefit from stable 
franchise locations. Perhaps the example of ice hockey 
holds the key; a sport which can also be considered 
'imported' and has a rather esoteric following. 
Correspondingly, the National Hockey League(NHL) does not 
have a major TV contract and thus it must be assumed that 
franchise locations have been chosen which are related to 
local levels of interest rather than the lure of the 
dollar - American or Canadian! This seems to be the case 
as many of the locations are in areas with relatively 
small populations. Thus soccer franchises should also be 
located in areas with suitable levels of interest. 
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CHAPTER III 
SPORTS FRANCHISE LOCATIONS 
A professional sports franchise is essentially a high 
order service, in the context of Christaller's central 
place theory. The service is only provided at certain 
times (much more frequently in the case of baseball than 
football) and because of its cost, needs a large threshold 
population in order to sustain its viability. Depending 
on the perceived quality of the service offered the 
consumer will be prepared to travel a maximum distance or 
range to obtain that service. The range will also vary 
according to the consumer's location. In an area where 
the consumer has a large choice of services (in the North 
Eastern United States for example) the range will probably 
be smaller. In a more remote area of the country however, 
the consumer might be willing to travel further to obtain 
the service desired. 
Ted Howard(l986) Executive Director of League 
Operations in the NASL, claimed in a personal interview 
that many NASL owners were involved because of the 
relative cheapness of acquiring a soccer franchise and the 
status that went with it. However, with the change in tax 
law, the incentive to sell the franchise at the end of 
five or eight years was reduced, leading to more stability 
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and more of the kind of owners who are interested in the 
welfare of the sport. 
The next question is where and why are franchises 
located? The ideal location would be to locate in an area 
where a large audience was guaranteed for every game. 
However, as Noll(l974) points out, the reason usually 
given as to why a team makes financial losses is that 
there is not enough support. If this were the case then 
only the largest cities would have a sufficient pool of 
fans. Demmert(l973) has examined the spatial pattern of 
professional sport and comes to the conclusion that the 
size (population) of a city is crucial to the success of 
any franchise. According to Loy(l973) the movement of a 
marginal franchise only serves to create another marginal 
franchise. An imbalance is inherent in the system because 
adding a star player, for example, to a big city team can 
add more to its revenue than can be earned by a small city 
team. Consequently, the big city team can afford to pay 
the small city team for its best players and this occurs 
despite the reserve clause which was designed to prohibit 
this by giving owners first refusal on a player's 
contract. 
Quirk(l973) claims that more often than not 
franchises are moved because they can generate greater 
income elsewhere and thus franchise moves permit small 
city franchises to make short term prof its. The 
implication of this is that some franchises are never 
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going to make long run profits, which in turn suggests 
that the optimum size of a professional sports league can 
be determined with the elimination of marginal franchises. 
There is a possibility however, that too much 
emphasis has been placed on large cities as the obvious 
location choices for franchises. There might be some 
smaller centers which are more amenable but have not been 
taken into consideration because of their relatively small 
populations. The rationale behind the location of a 
franchise in a 'big city' is that access to a large 
population will mean the potential is there to attract a 
large 'live' audience or a large television audience. 
College sport has evolved to provide sport in areas where 
professional teams will not locate because of the 
financial risks involved. This might explain, for 
example, the significance of Nebraska college football and 
Kentucky college basketball. In some areas, where the 
population is sufficiently large, professional and college 
sport can coexist such as at UCLA and the University of 
Michigan. 
This is essentially an application of central place 
theory. Professional sports franchises can be considered 
'high order' centers and consequently will have large 
threshold populations. More importantly, the range or 
distance that people are prepared to travel to obtain a 
service provided by a center, will be larger. 
Additionally, a central location while not having a large 
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population itself, might act as a focus for a much larger 
area. The example of Green Bay, Wisconsin with a 
population of 146,000, although an exception, is an 
indication that a smaller city can accomodate a 
professional sports team. Other smaller city examples can 
be seen in the National Hockey League, where Calgary, 
Edmonton, Quebec and Winnipeg all have populations less 
than 500,000 and yet possess NHL franchises. 
However, Michener(l976) suggests that television 
potential is more important than population. 
Horowitz(l974) states that 'Because broadcast rights have 
become an important source of revenues, they must play an 
important role in the financial planning of a franchise'. 
Few teams are profitable without broadcast revenues (and 
many are not even profitable with them!) Howard(l986) 
observed that the two most important factors in locating a 
soccer franchise were the size of the market and the TV 
potential. 
The area of dominant influence(ADI) allocates every 
county in the United States to a metro area which 
dominates its television viewing habits. Consequently, 
each city can be ranked according to the size of its T.V 
market. This can be seen in Table I. Michener(l976) 
cites the case of Baltimore, which has one of the largest 
population bases in the country and yet represents a 
'dubious sports market'. This is attributed to T.V 
viewers being siphoned off to Washington D.C in the south 
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TABLE I 
THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON 
FRANCHISE LOCATIONS 
1970 Area 1970 Rank 
Rank Population ADI 
,OOOs 1970 
1. New York 11529 1 
2. Los Angeles 7032 2 
3. Chicago 6979 3 
4. Philadelphia 4818 4 
5. Detroit 4200 7 
6. San Francisco/Oakland 3110 6 
7. Washington, D.C 2861 9 
8. Boston 2754 5 
9. Pittsburgh 2401 10 
10. St Louis 2363 12 
11. Dallas/Fort Worth 2318 11 
12. Baltimore 2071 19 
13. Cleveland 2064 8 
14. Houston 1985 14 
15. Minneapolis/St Paul 1814 13 
16. Seattle 1422 15 
17. Milwaukee 1404 26 
18. Atlanta 1390 16 
19. Cincinnati 1385 23 
20. San Diego 1358 34 
21. Buffalo 1349 24 
22. Miami 1268 18 
23. Kansas City 1254 22 
24. Denver 1228 28 
25. Indianapolis 1110 17 
26. New Orleans 1046 36 
27. Tampa 1013 20 
28. Portland 1009 25 
.source: Adapted From Michener(l976) 
and Philadelphia to the north and thus it has an ADI 
ranking lower than its population rank. Conversely, Tampa 
appears not to have the population potential to support a 
franchise and yet its ADI ranking suggests a large T.V 
population. Consequently, it can be assumed that 
franchise locations and relocations, in 'established' 
sports at least, are dictated not by fan support but by TV 
revenues. 
Major Sport Locations 
Hockey is not considered in the following evaluation 
because to a certain extent it has the same 
characteristics as soccer: that is a sport that is not 
established. In addition, Canada is not considered 
because subsequent data is restricted to the United 
States. 
If one considers the location of professional sports 
franchises in 1957 (fig 2), a clear North Eastern and Mid 
Western bias can be seen (although there were two NFL 
franchises in California). They were also concentrated in 
the larger cities as evidenced by the six franchises in 
New York, five in Chicago and four in Detroit. The rest 
of the country was a void as far as professional sports 
were concerned. 
This 'big city' pattern is duplicated in 1985 but the 
major change is that franchises are found in most parts of 
the country. As the number of franchises increased, the 
33 
• 
CJ 
0 
• 
a 
0 
1957 
Baseball 
Basketball 
Football 
1985 
3aseball 
Basketball 
Football 
Figure 2. The Location of Professional Sports Franchises 
1957 and 1985 
34 
North East and Mid West were exhausted of potential 
locations and thus the inevitable search for sites further 
afield took place. The most significant additions are to 
be found in the deep south and Texas and along the west 
coast. Los Angeles and the Bay area of California have 
become almost as important as New York in terms of the 
number of franchises and the Texan cities of Dallas and 
Houston also occupy prominent positions. 
Baseball seems to be the most spatially restricted of 
all the sports as, aside from the league's expansion to 
the west coast and a foray into East Texas and Atlanta 
many potential markets have remained unexplored. 
Conversely, Football seems to have been the most 
ubiquitous colonizer and can almost be considered the only 
sport to be represented as a major professional sport in 
the Deep South. 
The NBA has been the most adventurous of the 
leagues(although it might be more than coincidence that it 
is also the least profitable!) Sites have been chosen 
which many would not consider to be 'major league cities'. 
Salt Lake City, Phoenix and Indianapolis are good 
examples. 
If one considers fig 3 showing post war locational 
changes in the main sports leagues, some patterns can be 
seen. Major League Baseball shows a clearly defined 
westward movement while the NBA and NFL do also, although 
to a lesser extent. Looking at the table of franchise 
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location changes(table II)r this pattern can also be 
discerned. For example, if the franchise additions to a 
city are compared with a city's losses, then in the case 
of New York the net result is one more franchise gained 
than lost, while in the case of Los Angeles there have 
been eight additions and only three losses. Baltimore 
also shows a net gain of franchises, as do San Diego and 
Seattle for example while on the other hand Chicago, 
Boston and Kansas City all show a net loss. Clearly this 
is a rudimentary form of analysis, however it does shed 
some light on locational changes. 
Perhaps because of the lack of a lucrative TV 
contract, the NASL appears to have made many 'hit and 
miss' attempts to find viable locations. If one examines 
figure 4 a pattern is not clearly discernable although 
there does seem to be some kind of westward expansion away 
from the North East. In considering cities that have had 
an NASL franchise only to see it relocate or fold, 
Washington DC has had four different franchises and Boston 
has had three. Both these cities would seem ideal sites 
as both have fielded NFL and NBA teams(Boston also has a 
major league baseball and a NHL team). Bad management 
could have been a reason for the franchise's failure or it 
could have been that the sport market was already 
saturated. It must be remembered therefore, that a site 
that seems conducive to any type of franchise may not 
prove viable because of bad management. Essentially this 
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TABLE II 
FRANCHISE LOCATION CHANGES IN PROFESSIONAL 
FOOTBALL, BASKETBALL AND BASEBALL 
BY CITY 1945-85 
Expansions Losses Moved Moved Total 
From To Changes 
New York 7 3 4 1 15 
Los Angeles 4 2 1 4 11 
Baltimore 4 3 1 3 11 
Chicago 3 2 2 0 7 
San Diego 3 1 1 2 7 
Boston 2 2 2 0 6 
Buffalo 3 2 1 0 6 
Dallas 3 1 2 0 6 
Kansas City 2 1 1 2 6 
Oakland 3 1 1 1 6 
Cincinnati 2 1 1 1 5 
Miami 2 2 1 0 5 
Milwaukee 1 0 2 2 5 
St Louis 1 1 2 1 5 
Denver 2 2 0 0 4 
Houston 2 1 0 1 4 
Indianapolis 2 1 0 1 4 
Minneapolis 1 0 1 2 4 
Seattle 3 0 1 0 4 
Atlanta 1 0 1 2 4 
Cleveland 2 0 1 0 3 
New Orleans 2 0 1 0 3 
Philadelphia 0 0 2 1 3 
San Francisco 0 0 0 2 2 
Total 55 26 28 26 135 
Figure 4. Franchise Location Changes in the North American 
Soccer League 1968-85 
means that management can make or break a franchise 
whatever its potential. Unfortunately, this can be 
considered an intangible factor and so a franchise that 
fails ostensibly through low attendance might be located 
in a perfect site but badly managed. The converse might 
also be true; a franchise might survive for a long time in 
a bad location because of good management. It is also 
possible however that in the case of Boston and DC, soccer 
interest in these areas was not high enough and so perhaps 
alternative locations would have been more desirable. Fig 
5 shows all the locations that have ever been chosen by 
the NASL and reveals some interesting choices. They have 
perhaps not been constrained by the TV companies to such 
an extent as the 'established' leagues. Table III 
indicates which locations could be considered the more 
'succesful' in the NASL as it shows the cities which had a 
franchise for the most consecutive years. 
Many reasons have been attributed to the NASL's 
collapse. Although TV is considered the primary 
locational factor concerning sports franchises the NASL 
proved to be an exception. The NHL has tended to locate 
its franchises in areas with a high interest in hockey. 
Thus many of the sites have relatively small populations. 
A new soccer league could be started by locating teams in 
areas which will be genuinely interested in supporting a 
professional franchise. The following analysis will 
determine these optimum locations. 
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TABLE III 
MOST SUCCESFUL NORTH AMERICAN 
SOCCER LEAGUE FRANCHISES 
City Consecutive 
Years 
New York/Jersey City 14 
Miami 12 
Dallas 12 
Rochester 11 
San Jose 11 
Tampa/St Petersburg 10 
Seattle 10 
Chicago 10 
Portland 8 
St Louis 9 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
The main data base used was a sample of all NCAA 
division I schools which had soccer programs in 1985. 
Each school was contacted and asked to provide a team 
roster. Of the I87 Division 1 schools taking part in the 
1985 season, 150 responded which is an 80% sample of 
Division I schools. The location of the schools sampled 
relative to the parent population is shown in fig 6. Each 
player's place of origin was recorded. The assumption is 
that the more players that come from a certain area, then 
the greater the interest in soccer in that area. With a 
sample this size (nearly 3,500 soc~er players) the 
likelihood that chance is involved in the distribution is 
small. Thus if an area produces many players, this is 
probably du~ to good high school programs in the area, 
good coaching, good facilities or other similar factors; 
that is, a high level of interest in soccer. 
Correspondingly, this area might also be conducive to 
locating a professional franchise given the local 
emphasis. The assumption made here is that if interest in 
general is high then so will be the desire to spectate. 
At the very least, propensity to spectate will be higher 
than in an area with a lower level of interest. 
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One would expect more absolute production or programs 
in areas with large populations. So Los Angeles and New 
York for example are going to figure high in absolute 
terms whatever the variables. Location quotients are used 
to compare certain variables against an average of 1.00. 
Thus in the case of soccer players the national average is 
one player produced for every 77,584 of the 1981 
population. So an area producing 1 player per 155,168 
would be producing at 0.5 times the national average. 
Similarly an area that produces 1 player per 38,792 would 
have a location quotient of 2.00. Thus as Rooney has 
suggested, absolute production can be misleading and so 
the data have been converted to per capita indices. 
Division 1 schools were chosen because to reach that 
level of competition there must generally be an extra 
stimulus in the environment, if one accepts that potential 
talent is ubiquitously distributed. The quality of 
players in Division II or III will generally be lower and 
so the quality of coaching or facilities for example in 
the player's hometown will not be as high ceteris paribus. 
It was debated as to whether hometown or high school 
attended were a more appropriate measure. There is 
perhaps a danger in taking a person's hometown as his 
assumed area of experience as he might have lived most of 
his life elsewhere. Similarly, the high school attended 
might only have been the most recent one. It was decided 
that cases such as these would be in the minority and thus 
could be ignored, so the hometown was used. 
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It was decided that for the purposes of this study a 
player's college destination, as opposed to place of 
origin, was of little importance for two reasons. 
Firstly, soccer is not a big income sport and receives 
relatively little media attention. Consequently the 
emphasis placed on luring the best athletes with the kind 
of incentives which are common in football and basketball 
will probably not occur at the vast majority of colleges. 
Thus it is quite likely that a school is chosen by the 
player more for its academic facilities than its soccer 
program - especially at the non scholarship schools. 
Secondly, it is difficult to determine local interest from 
a player's migratory behavior. It is possible that a 
program is attracting many players from outside its 
immediate catchment area because local interest is low. 
Conversely a program that consists of mainly local talent 
is analagous to the non athletic situation where a student 
attends a local college because of its proximity. So one 
cannot assume that high local attraction means high local 
interest in itself. Thus one must not be oblivious to the 
implications of any student or student/athlete migration. 
The availability of college soccer programs was also 
considered an important factor. If a state has ten 
college programs while another state with a similar 
population only has two programs, then the first state 
must have a greater interest in soccer. The assumption 
here is that a college program is a response to a local 
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demand. The predominant program is that of a Division III 
school. This implies that soccer is more likely to be 
offered by smaller schools which is perhaps because of the 
relative cheapness of setting up a soccer program as 
opposed to a football program for example. Five hundred 
and forty three NCAA colleges had soccer programs in 
1984-85. If one assumes that interest in soccer is 
uniform throughout the country then these soccer offering 
colleges will be located relative to the nation's 
population. If as is more likely however, interest varies 
regionally, then the college locations will reflect this 
emphasis. Thus a per capita index was again formulated. 
It is possible that this index is too population sensitive 
however and so a second college index was derived. This 
took the percentage of all (NCAA and NAIA} schools in each 
state which had soccer programs. 
The problem with any areal delimitation is that 
political boundaries are essentially arbitrary. 
Additionally, aggregating data into large areal units 
hides detail. Thus to say that the United States contains 
nearly a quarter of a billion people says nothing about 
the distribution. Similarly, at the state level in the 
context of soccer interest, there might be a high overall 
interest which is merely the result of exceptional 
interest in one or two centers. The problem regards the 
level of resolution. Is the county level too high, the 
city level too small? Thus, two tiers of analysis will be 
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used. The state level of generalization will be assessed 
first, followed by the county level, while identifying the 
major cities and/or SMSA's within the particular counties. 
Participation in soccer was a factor considered to be 
of importance. The USSF furnished data indicating the 
number of registered youth and adult participants for each 
state. Presumably, the greater the participation then the 
greater the likelihood to spectate. The USSF is a 
nationally recognized organization. The majority of the 
players in the United States are members although there 
are other minor associations. 
Some conceptual considerations must be taken into 
account when trying to locate a professional sports 
franchise. Location quotients indicate interest or 
emphasis compared to a national norm but a franchise 
located in an area of above average interest but with a 
relatively small base population is unlikely to succeed. 
Thus one must assume a minimum base population for a 
franchise to survive. 
Once the high ranking states were determined, the 
county level was assessed to deduce more specific 
locations. Player production data were the only type 
available at this scale. They gave an indication of which 
cities would be good potential locations. 
A technique to determine potential audience is to 
assume that a standard proportion of people in a given 
population will be interested in soccer. American 
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Demographics conducted a survey in February 1987 which 
revealed that 5% of the American public watched soccer on 
T.V. Thus 5% is the arbitrary figure used in this study. 
This percentage is then multiplied by the location 
quotient of the area to give a soccer interest multiplier. 
The multiplier is then affected on the population of the 
relevant city to give a potential spectator pool. The 
base population is derived by aggregating the populations 
of the counties bordering on the relevant city. Of this 
pool, the majority will be floating supporters who will 
see very few games, but presumably a larger pool will have 
a larger core of potential dedicated supporters. This 
technique will be performed on all the cities under 
consideration and these cities will then be ranked in 
order to deduce the more desirable locations. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
State Indices of Interest 
In the case of the total number of college players 
produced, one can see from Table IV that, as one would 
expect, there is a correlation between population size and 
the number of players produced. Of the top ten producing 
states seven are among the ten most populous states. New 
York easily produces the most players but this needs to be 
reconciled with the fact that the state also has the most 
Division 1 college programs represented in the sample. 
Interestingly, the next highest producing 'region' would 
be the 339 players from abroad, a group which figure low 
in football, basketball and baseball production. This re-
emphasizes the claim that soccer is an imported sport! 
The three states which are not among the ten most populous 
are Missouri, Virginia and Maryland. However, they are 
all in the top 20 states by population. 
At the bottom end of Table IV six states do not 
produce any players at all. Alaska, Montana, South 
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming are the states which 
fall into this category. Vermont is perhaps the biggest 
surprise, as it is situated in the North Eastern/New 
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TABLE IV 
RANKED STATE PRODUCTION OF 
COLLEGE SOCCER PLAYERS 
Rank State Players Rank State Players 
Produced Produced 
1. New York 379 27. Colorado 14 
2. New Jersey 280 28. Oklahoma 12 
3. California 202 29. Oregon 11 
4. Pennsylvania 201 30. South Carolina 11 
5. Illinois 176 31. Kansas 10 
6. Missouri 158 32. Alabama 9 
7. Virginia 151 33. Maine 8 
8. Ohio 133 34. Hawaii 7 
9. Maryland 130 35. Nevada 7 
10. Florida 118 36. Mississippi 5 
11. Texas 113 37. Nebraska 5 
12. Connecticut 107 38. Idaho 4 
13. Massachusetts 101 39. Arizona 3 
14. Michigan 88 40. D.C 3 
15. North Carolina 67 41. New Mexico 3 
16. Wisconsin 67 42. Arkansas 2 
17. Washington 63 43. Iowa 2 
18. Georgia 50 44. North Dakota 1 
19. Tennessee 47 45. West Virginia 1 
20. Kentucky 43 46. Alaska 0 
21. Indiana 36 47. Montana 0 
22. Louisiana 22 48. South Dakota 0 
23. Minnesota 20 49. Utah 0 
24. Delaware 17 50. Vermont 0 
25. Rhode Island 17 51. Wyoming 0 
26. New Hampshire 16 
Foreign Players 339 
England portion of the country where one would expect at 
least some production. West Virginia and Washington D.C 
are the other states which one would expect to be more 
prominent and yet produced only one and three players 
respectively. 
Table V shows each state ranked by the index of 
player production. Fourteen states have above average 
production of college soccer players and of these there is 
a clear demarcation between six states with more than 
twice the national average and the eight with between 1 
and 1.70. On observing fig 7, the most obvious 
distinction is a North Eastern bias although Missouri is 
an exception to the Atlantic seaboard rule. It has the 
third highest ranking of 2.47 but this is slightly 
misleading as of the 157 players produced by the state of 
Missouri, 111 come from St Louis. So in this respect, it 
would be misleading to say that Missouri as a whole has a 
high degree of emphasis on soccer. Of the rest of the 
states with above average production, five are in the New 
England/North Eastern region, the lone Western 
representative is Washington~ while Wisconsin and Illinois 
champion the Mid West. 
The absolute number of NCAA college programs shows a 
similar pattern to that of player production. The most 
populous states again have the highest rankings indicating 
that the number of programs is a response firstly to 
population (Table VI). Table VII ranks the states by the 
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TABLE V 
RANKED PLAYER PRODUCTION INDICES 
Rank State Index Rank State Index 
1. New Jersey 2.94 27. Indiana 0.50 
2. Connecticut 2.67 28. Louisiana 0.40 
3. Missouri 2.49 29. Minnesota 0.38 
4. Maryland 2.39 30. Colorado 0.37 
5. Delaware 2.21 31. D.C 0.36 
6. Virginia 2.19 32. Idaho 0.32 
7. New York 1.67 33. Kansas 0.32 
8. Rhode Island 1. 39 34. Oregon 0.32 
9. Massachusetts 1. 36 35. Oklahoma 0.30 
10. New Hampshire 1.34 36. South Carolina 0.27 
11. Pennsylvania 1.31 37. Nebraska 0.24 
12. Illinois 1.19 38. Alabama 0.17 
13. Washington 1.18 39. New Mexico 0.17 
14. Wisconsin 1.10 40. Mississippi o.15 
15. Ohio 0.95 41. North Dakota 0.11 
16. Florida 0.93 42. Arizona 0.08 
17. Kentucky 0.91 43. Arkansas 0.06 
18. North Carolina 0.88 44. Iowa 0.05 
19. Tennessee 0.79 45. West Virginia 0.03 
20. Michigan 0.73 46. Alaska o.oo 
21. Georgia 0.71 47. Montana o.oo 
22. Nevada 0.67 48. South Dakota o.oo 
23. California 0.66 49. Utah o.oo 
24. Texas 0.61 50. Vermont 0.00 
25. Hawaii 0.56 51. Wyoming o.oo 
26. Maine 0.55 
Number of Soccer Player• 
Player Production Index 
Figure 7. Soccer Player Production 
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TABLE VI 
RANKED STATE PROVISION OF NCAA 
COLLEGE SOCCER PROGRAMS 
Rank State College Rank State College 
Programs Programs 
1. New York 75 27. Colorado 6 
2. Pennsylvania 58 28. South Carolina 5 
3. California 43 29. Washington 5 
4. Massachusetts 38 30. West Virginia 5 
5. Ohio 28 31. Alabama 4 
6. Illinois 25 32. Iowa 4 
7. Virginia 23 33. Louisiana 4 
8. New Jersey 22 34. Mississippi 2 
9. North Carolina 18 35. Oregon 2 
10. Connecticut 16 36. Delaware 1 
11. Florida 14 37. Nebraska 1 
12. Maryland 14 38. Nevada 1 
13. Indiana 13 39. New Mexico 1 
14. Wisconsin 13 40. Oklahoma 1 
15. Michigan 12 41. Utah 1 
16. Minnesota 11 42. Alaska 0 
17. Kentucky 10 43. Arizona 0 
18. Maine 9 44. Arkansas 0 
19. Texas 9 45. Hawaii 0 
20. Missouri 8 46. Idaho 0 
21. Tennessee 8 47. Kansas 0 
22. D.C 7 48. Montana 0 
23. Georgia 7 49. North Dakota 0 
24. New Hampshire 7 so. South Dakota 0 
25. Rhode Island 7 51. Wyoming 0 
26. Vermont 7 
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TABLE VI I 
RANKED NCAA SOCCER PROGRAM INDEX 
Rank State Index Rank State Index 
1. Vermont 5.74 27. Florida 0.60 
2. D.C 4.60 28. Iowa 0.57 
3. Maine 3.35 29. Michigan 0.54 
4. New Hampshire 3.18 30. Georgia 0.53 
s. Rhode Island 3.10 31. Nevada 0.52 
6. Massachusetts 2.77 32. Washington a.so 
7. Connecticut 2.16 33. Alabama 0.43 
8. Pennsylvania 2.05 34. Louisiana 0.39 
9. Virginia 1.80 35. Mississippi 0.33 
10. New York 1.79 36. New Mexico 0.32 
11. Maryland 1.39 37. Oregon 0.31 
12. North Carolina 1.28 38. Utah 0.28 
13. New Jersey 1.25 39. Nebraska 0.26 
14. Wisconsin 1.15 40. Texas 0.26 
15. Kentucky 1.14 41. Oklahoma 0.13 
16. Minnesota 1.13 42. Alaska 0.00 
17. Ohio 1.08 43. Arizona 0.00 
18. West Virginia 1.07 44. Arkansas 0.00 
19. Indiana 0.99 45. Hawaii 0.00 
20. Illinois 0.91 46. Idaho 0.00 
21. Colorado 0.87 47. Kansas 0.00 
22. California 0.76 48. Montana 0.00 
23. Tennessee 0.73 49. North Dakota o.oo 
24. Delaware 0.70 50. South Dakota 0.00 
25. Missouri 0.68 51. Wyoming 0.00 
26. South Carolina 0.67 
NCAA college programs index. One can see that only 
eighteen states are providing an above average rate. Ten 
states do not provide any programs at all. Of the top 13 
states all are in the North East/New England portion of 
the country(figure 8). Surprisingly, Vermont is the best 
provided for state in the country in terms of college 
programs despite producing no players itself! This could 
be due to there being only one Division 1 school in 
Vermont, which did not provide a roster for the survey and 
was thus not represented in the sample. However, one 
would still expect some players from Vermont to go to the 
numerous other schools playing soccer in the area. 
Similarly with Washington D.C: a very high ranking and 
high program index and yet only three players had their 
origins there. One explanation here could be that the 
District of Columbia's programs attract people from a 
large hinterland and thus are not just a response to the 
immediate surrounding area but to a larger area outside 
this. Similarly, the administrative region of D.C is 
relatively small and so there are probably many players 
who come from just outside the district but are considered 
part of Maryland or Virginia's production. 
The next group of states can be considered Mid 
Western (excluding West Virginia). Wisconsin, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois all have high 
quotients although Illinois' index of 0.99 is below 
average. Perhaps the most interesting finding so far is 
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that Texas, Florida and California, all states with high 
populations, do not have high rankings. 
The provision of all soccer programs (NCAA and NAIA) 
shows a similar pattern: the greatest provision generally 
occuring in the more populous states (fig 9). On a 
percentage basis, the highest provision occurs in New 
England and Ohio. The central plain states and the 
Rockies have the lowest proportions of soccer programs. 
Table X shows rankings by youth participation and 
this time a slightly different pattern emerges. Oklahoma 
makes a surprise entrance into the top ten, but this 
apart, the top ten states seem to be again dominated by 
the more populous. At the other end of the scale however, 
along with the Dakotas, Montana and Hawaii, are some New 
England states: Vermont, Delaware, Maine and New 
Hampshire. Table XI shows a large incongruity. One would 
expect, given previous findings, above average youth 
participation in soccer east of the Mississippi, but this 
is not the case. As can be seen from figure 10, the 
exceptional states are nearly all to the West of the 
Mississippi! One possible explanation for this is the 
fact that participation levels are represented by the 
number of registered players in the USSF while regional 
rates of registration differ. 
Total participation rates show a similar trend as 
witnessed in table XII. Total Participation is taken as 
the sum of all youth and adult players registered with the 
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TABLE VIII 
RANKED STJl.TE PROVISION OF NCAA AND 
NAIA SOCCER PROGRAMS 
Rank State Programs Rank State Programs 
1. New York 86 27. Mississippi 10 
2. Pennsylvania 63 28. New Hampshire 9 
3 . California 53 29. Vermont 8 
4. Ohio 4 :;_ 30. D.C 7 
5. Massachusetts 38 31. Rhode Island 7 
6. Illinois 35 32. Colorado 7 
7. North Carolina 29 33. Alabama 7 
8. New Jersey 24 34. Iowa 6 
9. Indiana 24 35. Kansas 6 
10. Virginia 23 36. Oklahoma 5 
11. Wisconsin 22 37. Louisiana 4 
12. Florida 20 38. Nebraska 4 
13. Michigan 18 39. Delaware 2 
14. Connecticut 16 40. New Mexico 2 
15. Maryland 15 41. Nevada 1 
16. Maine 15 42. Utah 1 
17. South Carolina 15 43. Arkansas 1 
18. Texas 14 44. Idaho 1 
19. Missouri 14 45. Alaska 0 
20. Tennessee 14 46. Arizona 0 
21. Georgia 14 47. Hawaii 0 
22. Minnesota 13 48. Montana 0 
23. Kentucky 11 49. North Dakota 0 
24. West Virginia 11 50. South Dakota 0 
25. Oregon 11 51. Wyoming 0 
26. Washington 10 
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TABLE IX 
PERCENTAGE OF NCAA AND NAIA SCHOOLS 
WITH VARSITY SOCCER PROGRAMS 
Rank State % Rank State % 
1. Connecticut 100 27. Minnesota 52 
2. New Jersey 100 28. Kentucky 50 
3. Rhode Island 100 29. Nevada 50 
4. Vermont 100 30. Georgia 48 
5. Maine 93 31. Michigan 47 
6. Massachusetts 92 32. Missouri 38 
7. New Hampshire 90 33. Tennessee 38 
8. New York 88 34. Alabama 33 
9. Ohio 85 35. New Mexico 33 
10. California 84 36. Kansas 28 
11. Maryland 83 37. Nebraska 28 
12. Pennsylvania 80 38. Texas 26 
13. D.C 77 39. Louisiana 25 
14. North Carolina 74 40. Iowa 22 
15. Wisconsin 73 41. Oklahoma 21 
16. Mississippi 71 42. Idaho 16 
17. Washington 71 43. Utah 16 
18. Illinois 70 44. Arkansas 6 
19. South Carolina 68 45. Hawaii 0 
20. Delaware 66 46. Alaska 0 
21. Indiana 64 47. Arizona 0 
22. Florida 64 48. Montana 0 
23. Oregon 61 49. North Dakota 0 
24. West Virginia 61 50. South Dakota 0 
25. Virginia 60 51. Wyoming 0 
26. Colorado 53 
Provi1ion of All Soccer Program• 
Percentage of College• with Soccer Program• 
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Figure 9. Total Soccer Program Provision (NCAA and NAIA) 
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TABLE X 
RANKED STATE YOUTH PARTICIPATION 
Rank State Players Rank State Players 
1. California 183848 27. Illinois 8156 
2. Texas 132628 28. Missouri 6840 
3. New York 94273 29. South Carolina 6725 
4. Washington 73233 30. Indiana 6696 
5. Pennsylvania 48448 31. Kentucky 6000 
6. Florida 41600 32. Kansas 5890 
7. Oklahoma 37918 33. North Carolina 5487 
8. New Jersey 27420 34. Idaho 5432 
9. Massachusetts 26921 35. Alabama 5367 
10. Virginia 26820 36. Arkansas 5192 
11. Arizona 24016 37. West Virginia 4643 
12. Georgia 21318 38. Nevada 4524 
13. Oregon 20190 39. D.C 3214 
14. Utah 19167 40. Alaska 3204 
15. Minnesota 18739 41. Rhode Island 2939 
16. Connecticut 18656 42. Iowa 2714 
17. Michigan 18414 43. Wyoming 2576 
18. Colorado 18132 44. New Hampshire 2434 
19. Maryland 15636 45. South Dakota 2018 
20. Ohio 14459 46. Montana 1717 
21. Tennessee 14101 47. Hawaii 1400 
22. New Mexico 12603 48. Maine 1200 
23. Louisiana 11617 49. Delaware 683 
24. Mississipi 10667 50. Vermont 527 
25. Nebraska 10205 51. North Dakota 0 
26. Wisconsin 8754 
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TABLE XI 
STATES RANKED BY THE INDEX OF 
YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN SOCCER 
Rank State Index Rank State Index 
1. Washington 3.82 27. Rhode Island 0.67 
2. Utah 2.83 28. Tennessee 0.66 
3. Oklahoma 2.70 29. South Dakota 0.63 
4. New Mexico 2.08 30. Louisiana 0.59 
5. Texas 2.01 31. New Hampshire 0.57 
6. Arizona 1.90 32. Kansas 0.53 
7. Alaska 1.72 33. West Virginia 0.51 
8. California 1.67 34. Arkansas 0. 49 
9. Oregon 1.65 35. Montana 0.47 
10. Nebraska 1.40 36. South Carolina 0.46 
11. Colorado 1.35 37. Michigan 0.42 
12. Connecticut 1.29 38. Wisconsin 0.40 
13. Idaho 1.24 39:--Kentucky 0.35 
14. Nevada 1.22 40. Hawaii o.31 
15. Wyoming 1.18 41. Missouri 0.30 
16. New York 1.15 42. Alabama 0.29 
17. D.C 1.08 43. Ohio 0.28 
18. Virginia 1.08 44. Indiana 0.26 
19. Massachusetts 1.01 45. Delaware 0.24 
20. Minnesota 0.99 46. Maine 0.23 
21. Florida 0.92 47. Vermont 0.22 
22. Mississippi 0.91 48. North Carolina 0.20 
23. Pennsylvania 0.88 49. Iowa 0.20 
24. Georgia 0.84 so. Illinois 0.15 
25. New Jersey 0.80 51. North Dakota 0.00 
26. Maryland 0.80 
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TABLE XI I 
RANKED STATE TOTAL PARTICPATION 
Rank State Players Rank State Players 
1. California 208848 27. Wisconsin 10254 
2. Texas 147628 28. South Carolina 7675 
3. New York 101073 29. Missouri 7640 
4. Washington 76633 30. Indiana 7096 
5. Pennsylvania 50998 31. Kansas 6440 
6. Florida 43600 32. Kentucky 6250 
7. Oklahoma 40418 33. Idaho 6132 
8. New Jersey 31220 34. North Carolina 5987 
9. Virginia 29324 35. Nevada 5974 
10. Massachusetts 28570 36. Arkansas 5592 
11. Arizona 24816 37. Alabama 5567 
12. Georgia 22918 38. West Virginia 4943 
13. Colorado 22332 3 9. Alaska 3804 
14. Oregon 22290 40. D.C 3512 
15. Connecticut 20056 41. Rhode Island 3239 
16. Utah 19667 42. Iowa 3114 
17. Minnesota 19539 43. New Hampshire 2634 
18. Michigan 19214 44. Wyoming 2576 
19. Ohio 16859 45. Montana 2317 
20. Maryland 16636 46. South Dakota 2018 
21. Tennessee 15301 47. Hawaii 1900 
22. New Mexico 13803 48. Delaware 1233 
23. Louisiana 13467 49. Maine 1200 
24. Nebraska 11005 50. Vermont 877 
25. Mississippi 10917 51. North Dakota 0 
26. Illinois 10756 
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USSF. Table XIII, showing the total participation index, 
corroborates the previous findings and the Western bias 
can be seen in fig 11. 
Thus one can conclude that for college indices of 
interest, the North East/New England area and the Midwest 
are the regions where the degree of emphasis is above 
average, while for participation variables, the Western 
half of the country is more prominent. 
The County and City Scale 
The next step is to examine the county and city level 
in order to determine more specific areas of interest. In 
absolute terms, as one would expect, the cities producing 
the greatest number of players are the country's larger 
cities (table XIV). St Louis produces the most players 
with 111 while the next largest production centres are 
Philadelphia and Dallas, both with 36. Some interesting 
features at the top of the list are Louisville, Kentucky 
and Columbia, Maryland, neither of which one would call 
'major league' cities. Further down the list are quite a 
few cities which have no professional sports franchises 
and thus one would not expect these to be considered in 
locating a professional team. The indices used are for 
the dominant county so in the case of Chicago for example, 
Cook is the dominant county. 
Table XV ranks the counties by the index of soccer 
player production. Of the 382 counties which produced at 
67 
68 
TABLE XIII 
STATES RANKED BY THE INDEX OF 
TOTAL PARTICIPATION IN SOCCER 
Rank State Index Rank State Index 
1. Washington 3.67 27. Rhode Island 0.67 
2. Utah 2.66 28. Tennessee 0.65 
3. Oklahoma 2.64 29. Louisiana 0.63 
4. New Mexico 2.09 30. Montana 0.58 
5. Texas 2.05 31. South Dakota 0.57 
6. Alaska 1.87 32. New Hampshire 0.56 
7. Arizona 1. 80 33. Kansas 0.53 
8. California 1. 74 34. West Virginia 0.50 
9. Oregon 1. 67 35. South Carolina 0.48 
10. Colorado 1. 53 36. Arkansas 0.48 
11. Nevada 1.47 37. Wisconsin 0.43 
12. Nebraska 1. 38 38. Delaware 0.41 
13. Idaho 1.28 39. Michigan 0.41 
14. Connecticut 1.27 40. Hawaii o.38 
15. New York 1.13 41. Vermont 0.33 
16. D.C 1. 08 42. Kentucky 0.33 
17. Wyoming 1.08 43. Ohio 0.30 
18. Virginia 1. 08 44. Missouri 0.30 
19. Massachusetts 0.98 45. Alabama 0.28 
20. Minnesota 0.94 46. Indiana 0.25 
21. Florida 0.88 47. Iowa 0.21 
22. Mississippi 0.85 48. Maine 0.21 
23. Pennsylvania 0.85 49. North Carolina 0.20 
24. New Jersey 0.83 50. Illinois 0.18 
25. Georgia 0.83 51. North Dakota 0.00 
26. Maryland 0.78 
Total Participation 
Total Participation Indea 
Figure 11. Total Participation in Soccer 
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TABLE XIV 
LEADING CITIES IN TOTAL PRODUCTION 
OF SOCCER PLAYERS 
Rank City Players Index 
1. St Louis MO 111 19.00 
2. Dallas TX 36 2.79 
3. Philadelphia PA 36 1. 83 
4. Cincinnati OH 31 2.93 
5. Brooklyn NY 30 1. 07 
6. Chicago IL 29 1. 32 
7. Baltimore MD 25 2.46 
8. Atlanta GA 23 3.28 
9. Louisville KY 22 2.71 
10. Columbia MD 22 14.39 
11. Seattle WA 22 2.56 
12. Milwaukee WI 22 2.57 
13. San Jose CA 19 2.27 
14. Memphis TN 19 2.09 
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TABLE xv 
LEADING COUNTIES RANKED BY THE INDEX 
OF SOCCER PLAYER PRODUCTION 
Rank County State Population Players Index 
Produced 
1. Falls Church VA 9515 8 65.23 
2. Manassas VA 15438 6 30.15 
3. Williamsburg VA 9870 3 23.58 
4. Rockwall TX 14528 4 21.36 
5. Washington WI 84848 22 20.11 
6. St Louis City MO 453085 111 19.00 
7. Rowan KY 19049 4 16.29 
8. Howard MD 118572 22 14.39 
9. Adams IL 71622 12 12.99 
10. Montgomery TX 128487 18 10.86 
11. Fairfax VA 596901 73 9.48 
12. Douglas co 25153 3 9.25 
13. Alexandria VA 103217 11 8.26 
14. Bristol RI 46942 5 8.26 
15. Tolland CT 114823 12 8.10 
16. Mercer NJ 307863 29 7.30 
17. Fauquier VA 35889 3 6.48 
18. Monmouth NJ 503173 42 6.47 
19. Rockdale GA 36747 3 6.33 
20. Orleans NY 38496 3 6.04 
21. Dutchess NY 245055 18 5.69 
22. Madison IL 247691 18 5.63 
23. Vanderburgh IN 167515 12 5.55 
24. Leelanau MI 14007 1 5.53 
25. Sumner TN 85790 6 5.42 
26. Sagadahoc ME 28795 2 5.38 
27. Montgomery MD 579053 40 5.35 
28. Hunterdon NJ 87361 6 5.32 
29. Du Page IL 658835 45 5.29 
30. Schoharie NY 29710 2 5.22 
least one player, 259 produced at a level above the 
national norm. At the top end of the scale are the three 
Virginia counties of Falls Church, Manassas and 
Williamsburg. Fairfax, Alexandria and Faquier counties 
also figure prominently. Significantly, the top three 
counties all have populations of less than 20,000 and 
Williamsburg and Falls Church are both less than 10,000. 
The other three counties have more substantial base 
populations. Thus in considering potential franchise 
locations, the latter counties would be more appropriate. 
The City of St Louis is again a prime candidate as not 
only does it have an extremely high interest level ( 19.0 ) 
but it also has a large population ( 453,085 ). In 
addition, St Louis county with a population of 973,896 
also has an above average index of 2.94. 
Two Texas counties rank in the top ten which is 
perhaps a surprise considering the low quotient for the 
state as a whole. Rockwall has a low population of 14,528 
but if one combines this with adjacent Dallas county, then 
the additional population is 1,556,390, while Dallas 
county itself has a high quotient of 2.79. Thus it would 
seem that the Dallas/Fort Worth area would be an excellent 
possibility for a soccer franchise. 
At this stage it is appropriate to refer to fig 12 
which shows the player production index for each county in 
the United States. Connecticut is a state that is 
prominent for all the variables. Tolland is the only 
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entrant in the top 50 counties however. Hartford is the 
next Connecticut county with a quotient of 3.55 and a 
sizeable population of 807,766. Fairfield is another 
county with an impressive quotient of 2.78 and a 
population above 800,000. Either of these areas would be 
ideal for a franchise. Although the other counties in the 
state have quotients above the national average, none have 
the populations to match Fairfield and Hartford. The City 
of Hartford stands out as the perfect location both in 
terms of interest and centrality. Connecticut, however 
could be a case where a regional franchise might be a good 
idea. That is, a franchise that changes locations to 
accomodate a high level of interest throughout the state. 
Maryland has very high quotients in all the areas around 
the city of Baltimore with the exception of Baltimore 
county. The high population in and around this SMSA 
further suggests that Baltimore would be a very good 
location. As has been mentioned previously, Washington 
D.C has been the site of four different NASL franchises 
and it was suggested that interest levels might not have 
been sufficiently high. This seems to be coroborrated by 
the interest level indices. It is marginally above 
average on all the participation indices while on the 
production level it is well below average ( 0.36 ) 
although having a good college program index of 4.60. It 
would seem that a location south of the Potomac would be 
much more desirable than one in D.C itself and in 
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combination with Baltimore, would provide ample 
opportunity for people to watch professional soccer in the 
Maryland/DC/Virginia area. 
New York and New Jersey both figure prominently in 
all the interest rankings. Only one of the counties in 
New Jersey has a quotient lower than 1.00. In addition, 
the majority of the counties have populations 
significantly higher than 100,000. On examining fig 12 it 
is clear that interest declines in southern New Jersey 
where quotients are only marginally a~ove average. 
Trenton would be a good site as Mercer county has a very 
high interest level (7.30), though it is probably safe to 
assume that anywhere in the Newark/Jersey City 
metropolitan area would be a perfect location. In fact, 
this is the site of the Meadowlands where the Cosmos of 
the NASL played their games. Ignoring the managerial and 
financial issues this was considered the perfect NASL 
location because of its site and atmosphere. 
On closer examination of up-state New York in fig 12, 
the region on the edge of Lake Ontario composed of 
Niagara, Orleans, Monroe and Wayne counties, must be given 
high priority. Although Orleans and Wayne have relatively 
small populations, Niagara and Monroe have nearly 1 
million inhabitants between them. The biggest city in 
this region is Rochester which had a relatively succesful 
franchise in the NASL. The second area is the cluster of 
counties around Albany. The populations are somewhat 
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smaller and perhaps the interest levels are not quite high 
enough to justify locating a franchise here as it might 
prove to be too marginal in a small league. If the league 
was larger however (a point that will be examined later) 
then Albany would probably be a good location. Long 
Island/New York City is crying out for a franchise! Its 
population is considerable and if the team located in the 
Meadowlands was considered to be from New Jersey then New 
York City must have a representative too. 
Althoug~ the Pennsylvania county with the highest 
quotient is Pike, its population of 18,271 is too small 
for it to be given much consideration. The next highest 
counties are all in and around the city of Philadelphia. 
Not only do these have high quotients but they also have 
large populations. In addition, the bordering counties of 
New Jersey also have high quotients, re-emphasising 
Philadelphia as an ideal site. 
The Deep South and Florida is a region that does not 
figure very highly for any of the rankings and yet had a 
very successful NASL franchise in Tampa and other 
moderately prosperous teams in Miami and Jacksonville. 
Dade county has an index of 1.00 but the important point 
is its population is over 1.5 million; the major city 
being Miami. Duval county, containing Jacksonville, has a 
very high index of interest (2.03) and its population of 
571,003 is also appreciably high. Orange (Orlando)is 
another possibility with a population of 471,016. 
76 
Hillsborough has a slightly lower quotient but a larger 
base population making Tampa a viable prospect. The only 
significant area in Georgia is the group of counties 
containing Atlanta; thus a significant base population is 
available. 
Cuyahoga county, Ohio stands out with its high 
population of nearly 1.5 million and an interest level of 
1.5. Hamilton also, with a population of nearly 900,000 
and an emphasis quotient of 2.93 is significant. 
Montgomery has a reasonable population of 571,697 and a 
high quotient (2.03) as does Summit (524,472 and 2.81 
respectively). Thus Cleveland, Cincinnati, Dayton and 
Akron in the state of Ohio would all be good potential 
sites. 
In Kentucky, Jefferson county (Louisville) has a 
quotient of 2.71 and a population of 685,004. In 
addition, as was previously mentioned, Louisville had high 
absolute production of players and can thus be considered 
a possible location. 
Illinois shows a strong concentration of interest 
around the Chicago area; Cook, Du Page and Lake all have 
high quotients and populations. In Minnesota, Minneapolis 
is the obvious choice for a location while in Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee is the only real area of interest. Kansas, 
although having a low interest level in general, reveals a 
high interest level in Johnson county with a population of 
over 270,000; Kansas City, Missouri is the dominant SMSA. 
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In the Far West, Los Angeles is almost considered a 
natural choice in locating a franchise. However, NASL 
franchises were never successful there despite it being a 
potentially good market with a large population. This is 
borne out by a low interest level of 0.36 (0.96 for Orange 
county}. The areas that do stand out in California are 
Alameda and Santa Clara. So San Jose would probably be a 
good location with Oakland a possibility. King county 
Washington, containing Seattle, is a prime candidate for a 
franchise as it has a population of more than 1.25 million 
and a quotient of 2.56. 
Possible Franchise Locations 
In locating soccer franchises, one must consider that 
if the interest in a state as a whole is high, one must 
still pick a location within the state. The case of 
Missouri is an example where state interest is high but St 
Louis is the only area with any interest of consequence. 
As one is essentially considering a pool of potential 
spectators, then even if the state interest level is low, 
if a local concentration of interest is sufficiently high 
then this might be a good place to locate. 
A number of cities have been determined as potential 
locations for a league. The next step is to determine the 
potential spectator 'pool' for each of these sites. Table 
XVI shows the results of this analysis along with the 1985 
ADI ranking. Interestingly, the ADI shows that many of 
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TABLE XVI 
POTENTIAL SPECTATOR POOL FOR 
SELECTED CITIES 
City Potential T.V 
Crowd Potential 
1. New York 1 
2 Jersey City 1 
3. Chicago 525665 3 
4. Philadelphia 344145 4 
5. Dallas 314054 8 
6. San Jose 278955 20 
7. D.C 263065 9 
8. Los Angeles 249190 2 
9. St Louis 248805 17 
10 Boston 247240 6 
11. Baltimore 244360 21 
12. Detroit 218935 7 
13. Seattle 209310 15 
14. Cleveland 205060 11 
15 San Francisco 193815 5 
16. Hartford 189385 22 
17. Milwaukee 166665 29 
18. Atlanta 162880 16 
19. Cincinnati 151185 28 
20. Miami 126910 13 
21. Rochester 123795 69 
22. Tampa 119090 18 
23. Dayton 104385 53 
24. Louisville 96285 45 
25. Pittsburgh 92815 12 
26. Raleigh 89155 38 
27. Minneapolis 77045 14 
28. Houston 73600 10 
29. Jacksonville 69545 64 
30. Nashville 60620 31 
31. Albany 53985 49 
32. Norfolk · 42600 47 
33. Denver 42314 19 
34. New Orleans 34410 35 
35. Portland 27085 23 
36. Richmond 11560 55 
these locations are not considered very good T.V markets 
and so the results are more of an indication of pure 
interest in soccer. Los Angeles is a high entrant but has 
been ommited from initial consideration because of the 
experience of the NASL. Using the spectator potential 
technique, the city would appear in a 12 team league but 
this is merely because of the large populations of the 
surrounding counties, while interest levels in each are 
all less than 1.00. 
New York City and Jersey City have automatically been 
assigned a franchise because the interest levels are very 
high in the whole of this region and so any assumption of 
a base population would be too arbitrary. Thus a 12 team 
league would be comprised of these two cities plus the 
following ten: Philadelphia, Arlington, Dallas, San Jose, 
Chicago, St Louis, Boston, Seattle, Detroit and Baltimore. 
This technique can then be used to add franchises to the 
league in multiples of four in order of suitability. The 
time period for these additions would be a managerial 
decision based on circumstances at the time. Clearly, an 
expansion as fast as that witnessed by the NASL needs to 
be avoided. Table XVII shows the expansion from a 12 to 
28 team league with a suggestion as to an east/west 
conference alignment to minimize travelling time. 
In considering competition, there is high school 
football on Friday nights, college on Saturdays and 
professional on Sundays. As soccer is a weekend sport 
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TABLE XVII 
PROFESSIONAL SOCCER LEAGUE EXPANSION SHOWING 
POSSIBLE EAST/WEST CONFERENCE ALIGNMENT 
West East 
Chicago New York 
San Jose New Jersey 
St Louis Philadelphia 
Detroit D.C 
Dallas Baltimore 
Seattle Cleveland 
Milwaukee Hartford 
Atlanta Cincinnati 
Miami Rochester 
Tampa Dayton 
Louisville Pittsburgh 
Minneapolis Raleigh 
Houston Nashville 
Jacksonville Albany 
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there is probably no way that it would be able to compete 
with the firmly entrenched sport of football. In early· 
spring, the more northern cities would be too cold to play 
in and thus late spring/early summer is probably the ideal 
time to play. The amount of competition with a ~aseball 
team in the same market is determined by the baseball 
team's success at that particular period of time and thus 
is something that cannot be predicted. On the point of 
competition, of the 12 locations which would be added for 
a 20,24 and 28 team expansion, only Atlanta, Cincinnati, 
Pittsburgh, Minneapolis and Houston would be competing 
with a major league baseball team. Thus these 'marginal' 
franchises would have a much better chance of survival 
(fig 13). 
The majority of the locations are obvious considering 
the state interest levels, but some sites need to be 
justified. Firstly, the Deep South is a region which 
exhibits consistently low interest levels for all the 
soccer variables on the state level and yet there are 
three franchises located in the area, two of which are in 
Florida. Georgia is a state which appears to be 
especially inconducive but as can be seen from fig 12 
there is a high concentration of interest around Atlanta. 
Additionally, a franchise located here, while having to 
compete with the Braves baseball team would have virtually 
no competition from other soccer teams. The two Florida 
sites have both been succesful NASL franchises although 
82 
o Prospective Soccer 
Franchise 
• Competition with Baseball 
0 100 200 300 
MILES 
Figure 13. Prospective Soccer Franchise Locations Indicating 
Competition with Major League Baseball Teams 
CXl 
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state interest is relatively low. Thus, these enclaves of 
high interest justify a franchise location. There would 
also be no competition with other sports. Another area to 
discuss is the state of Ohio. Three franchises have been 
allocated but it might be that this is too many for such a 
small area considering the close proximity of other teams. 
Dayton might be discarded and a location in Los Angeles 
added instead, if national interest in soccer is at a high 
enough level. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The NASL was the first professional soccer league in 
the United States which had any kind of popular appeal and 
yet its sixteen year existence prompted many to doubt 
whether a soccer league could ever survive in a country 
with no soccer tradition. Four points must be considered 
in order to establish a professional league: 
i) Americans generally like to watch American players, 
with whom they can identify with. Thus a league should 
restrict rosters to a maximum of two 'foreign' players as 
do the majority of the World's leagues. This would also 
give more playing time to native Americans and so although 
the calibre of play would be of a lower standard at first, 
it would provide players out of college with the 
experience they have lacked in the past. 
ii) Player wages should be commensurate with the financial 
standing of the league. This could be achieved by having 
Americans on the team who have no reputation as did the 
'star' foreign players of the NASL. Thus salaries could 
be kept to a reasonable proportion of total costs. 
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iii) A professional soccer league should dissociate itself 
from indoor soccer and the MISL. The uninitiated 
spectator seeing the freescoring excitement of the MISL 
versus the subtle, tactical entertainment of the real game 
will probably opt for the indoor version. An educated 
audience needs to be fostered. 
iv) Television is an important way of spreading the 
gospel. Some soccer on T.V is better than none. Thus the 
media should be seen as a means of generating interest 
rather than as th~ main source of income. 
It was decided that interest levels should be the 
major criteria in locating soccer franchises. Tradition 
does not appear overnight and so a league can only expand 
to any extent when the grass roots are present. It would 
appear that with participation rates increasing year by 
year, the time is ripe to initiate a professional league, 
using the locations described. However, although a high 
youth quotient indicates high interest, this does not 
necessarily correlate with a propensity to spectate 
because there is not always the financial means to 
spectate. However, in terms of franchise locations, youth 
players could be considered the paying customers of the 
future. 
Twenty eight suitable locations have been chosen on 
the basis of interest levels. Although the NASL had 
franchises located in Canada, this study limited its scope 
to the United States because of the ease of standardizing 
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data. Thus, it is quite possible that suitable sites 
north of the border are being overlooked. The assessment 
relied heavily on college player production as this was 
data readily available on the county level. State data 
were only given brief consideration because of the 
internal variety possible. To improve this study, other 
variables of soccer interest need to be formulated on the 
county level; the problem of course is that data are not 
readily available at this level of definition. 
It must be remembered that all these indices of 
interest are merely that: indicators of interest which do 
not by themseves mean that people will want to watch 
soccer. 
The method of chosing the final locations was fairly 
crude and seven of the 28 locations chosen were never 
considered by the NASL. This could be a confirmation of 
the fact that that the NASL did not consider local 
interest to any great extent, as otherwise it might have 
chosen some of those seven sites. In addition, many of 
these sites are what could be considered 'smaller' cities. 
Thus soccer could become the first professional league in 
the United States to establish itself by taking advantage 
of locations which have previously been considered too 
risky. 
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